The wave of protests that has swept across Iran since late December 2025 is not merely another episode of economic unrest. It represents the most profound crisis of legitimacy faced by the Islamic Republic since the 1979 Revolution. Soaring inflation, the collapse of the rial, and the erosion of everyday livelihoods may have ignited the demonstrations, but what has unfolded in Iran’s streets goes far beyond bread-and-butter grievances. Increasingly, the protests question the very foundations of the political system itself.
From Tehran’s Grand Bazaar to provincial cities long considered loyal to the regime, chants have shifted from economic demands to open rejection of clerical rule. In this volatile moment, a familiar yet controversial figure has re-emerged onto the political stage: Reza Pahlavi, the son of Iran’s last shah.
Reza Pahlavi and the Politics of Exile
For more than four decades, Reza Pahlavi has lived in exile, largely on the margins of Iranian political life. To some Iranians, particularly within the diaspora, the Pahlavi era symbolizes stability, modernization, and engagement with the West. To others, it evokes memories of authoritarianism, inequality, and repression under a monarchy propped up by foreign powers.
The current unrest, however, has given Pahlavi an opportunity unlike any before. Unlike his cautious, symbolic interventions during previous protest movements, he has adopted a far more assertive posture. Through public addresses and coordinated messaging, he has called for nationwide civil disobedience, urged security forces to defect from the regime, and unveiled a framework for a post–Islamic Republic transition.
Crucially, Pahlavi insists he is not seeking the restoration of an absolute monarchy. Instead, he presents himself as a transitional figure—someone who could help guide Iran toward a referendum in which citizens would freely choose their preferred system of governance, whether a republic, a constitutional monarchy, or another democratic model. This framing is a deliberate attempt to recast himself not as a relic of Iran’s past, but as a facilitator of its political future.
Yet his support inside Iran remains uncertain. While monarchist slogans and pre-1979 symbols have appeared at some demonstrations, available surveys and activist networks suggest that most Iranians desire systemic change without necessarily endorsing a return to monarchy. Younger protesters, in particular, tend to favor a secular republic rather than leadership rooted in dynastic legacy.
International Sympathy Without Formal Backing
Abroad, Reza Pahlavi’s reception has been far warmer. Iranian diaspora communities across Europe and North America have mobilized in his support, organizing large demonstrations, lobbying for tougher sanctions against Tehran, and promoting him as a unifying alternative to clerical rule. Several Western political figures have expressed open sympathy, portraying him as a credible voice for democratic transition.
Nevertheless, no major government has formally endorsed Reza Pahlavi as Iran’s alternative leader. Western capitals remain cautious, haunted by the failures of externally supported regime change in Iraq, Libya, and Afghanistan. For Washington and its allies, regional stability, nuclear nonproliferation, and the avoidance of state collapse continue to outweigh enthusiasm for revolutionary outcomes.
China and Russia have gone further, emphasizing non-interference and reaffirming their support for Iran’s sovereignty. In this geopolitical landscape, international backing for Pahlavi remains largely symbolic and rhetorical rather than strategic or decisive.
The State Responds: Repression as Doctrine
Inside Iran, the government’s response has followed a familiar pattern. Authorities imposed nationwide internet blackouts, disrupted international communications, deployed the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Basij militias, and carried out mass arrests. Official narratives depict the protests as foreign-orchestrated unrest, blaming the United States, Israel, and exiled opposition groups.
Yet beneath the rhetoric of control lies visible anxiety. Some civilian officials have acknowledged deep economic mismanagement and warned that excessive violence risks further alienating the population. Still, real power in Iran rests with the Supreme Leader and the security apparatus, and they have shown little appetite for compromise.
As in past crises, the regime’s survival hinges on the cohesion and loyalty of its security forces. So long as that cohesion holds, the Islamic Republic retains its most decisive advantage: coercive power.
What Comes Next for Iran?
Iran now stands at a historic crossroads, with several plausible—and perilous—paths ahead.
One possibility is repressive continuity: the state suppresses dissent, fractures the opposition, and survives, albeit more brittle and isolated than before. Another scenario involves limited reforms from above, offering economic concessions and superficial political adjustments to defuse public anger without altering the system’s core. Given the depth of public mistrust, this option appears increasingly ineffective.
The most consequential scenario would be a fracture within the ruling elite or security forces. Should parts of the military or Revolutionary Guard refuse to continue repressing protesters, the regime’s foundations could rapidly erode. In such a moment, figures like Reza Pahlavi could assume a transitional role—not as rulers, but as symbols around which a fragmented opposition might coalesce.
Ultimately, Iran’s future will not be decided in Washington, Paris, or in the exile communities of Los Angeles. It will be shaped on Iran’s streets, within its barracks, and in the moral calculations of those who hold power: whether to preserve a system through force, or to allow the emergence of a new political order.
One reality, however, is already clear. Fear no longer belongs exclusively to the state. And when fear changes hands, history has a way of moving faster than anyone expects.
