On October 20, 2025, Indonesia’s new presidential administration—led by President Prabowo Subianto and Vice President Gibran Rakabuming Raka—marked its first full year in office. Elected in a landslide victory in February 2024 and inaugurated on October 20, 2024, the Prabowo–Gibran ticket entered office with high expectations, ambitious campaign promises, and a commanding parliamentary coalition. Yet, after twelve months of governance, the picture that emerges is complex: a mix of bold policy shifts, intense political maneuvering, and growing public skepticism. This reflection examines the administration’s first year through three critical lenses: its macroeconomic performance and flagship policies, its political strategy and cabinet dynamics, and its impact on democracy and civil liberties. Together, these dimensions reveal a government that prioritizes stability and control—but at a cost to transparency, democratic norms, and inclusive growth.
Economic Policy and Macroeconomic Performance: Populism Over Productivity
The Prabowo–Gibran administration has pursued a sharp pivot in economic priorities, moving away from the infrastructure-heavy model of its predecessor toward a more redistributive, populist approach. While President Prabowo initially pledged policy continuity, his government has redirected significant state resources toward social welfare programs—most notably the Free Nutritious Meals (Makanan Bergizi Gratis, or MBG) initiative, the Red-and-White Cooperatives, and expanded military modernization.
This shift reflects a strategic choice: deliver immediate, visible benefits to secure public support, even if it risks long-term fiscal sustainability. The 2025 state budget allocated a staggering Rp71 trillion (approximately USD 4.5 billion) to the MBG program alone, targeting over 82 million beneficiaries, including schoolchildren, pregnant women, and toddlers. At the same time, funding for the new capital city, Ibu Kota Nusantara (IKN), was slashed to just Rp143 billion, signaling a de-emphasis on mega-projects in favor of grassroots welfare.
However, macroeconomic outcomes have fallen short of both public expectations and official targets. Economic growth has stagnated at 4–5%, well below the aspirational 8% or even the more realistic 6–7% projected by the government. Unemployment remains a pressing concern: by August 2025, over 44,000 formal-sector layoffs had been recorded, and an estimated one million university graduates were jobless. Investment inflows, while substantial (Rp491.4 trillion in Q3 2025), generated only 696,478 new jobs—translating to a cost of Rp705.7 million per job, up from the previous year.
To cushion the blow, the government rolled out four major stimulus packages totaling over Rp100 trillion, including direct cash transfers to 35.4 million low-income households. Yet public sentiment remains pessimistic. A Celios survey found that 45% of respondents felt their household economic conditions had not improved, while 27% reported worsening conditions. Moreover, 84% believed their tax burden had increased—a perception that undermines the government’s claim of economic relief.
In sum, the administration has succeeded in maintaining social stability through cash transfers and food aid, but it has failed to ignite productive, job-creating growth. The economy remains vulnerable, and the heavy reliance on fiscal stimulus raises concerns about long-term debt sustainability and inflationary pressures.
The “Red-and-White Cabinet”: Political Accommodation and Frequent Reshuffles
From the outset, the Prabowo–Gibran administration adopted a strategy of inclusive political accommodation, assembling what is arguably Indonesia’s largest and most diverse cabinet in decades. Dubbed the “Red-and-White Cabinet,” it includes figures from across the political spectrum—even former rivals.
This approach was designed to consolidate the Indonesia Maju Plus Coalition, which commands 470 of 580 parliamentary seats (81%), effectively eliminating formal opposition. To further neutralize dissent, the administration granted amnesty to PDIP Secretary-General Hasto Kristiyanto and clemency to former Trade Minister Tom Lembong, both of whom had been convicted in politically sensitive cases.
Yet this apparent unity has been punctuated by four major cabinet reshuffles within the first year—a sign of internal turbulence and performance anxiety:
- February 20, 2025: Early adjustments, including the appointment of Brian Yuliarto as Minister of Higher Education, Science, and Technology.
- September 8, 2025: The most sweeping overhaul—five ministers dismissed (including Sri Mulyani as Finance Minister), three new ministers appointed, and the creation of a new Ministry of Hajj and Umrah.
- September 17, 2025: Erick Thohir named Minister of Youth and Sports; Djamari Chaniago appointed Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs.
- October 10, 2025: Mass appointments of Eselon I officials across ministries.
These reshuffles suggest a government in constant recalibration—responding to scandals (like the MBG food poisoning crisis), poor ministerial performance, or shifting political winds. Independent evaluations confirm these concerns: a Celios survey ranked Minister of Energy Bahlil Lahadalia as the worst-performing minister (with a net approval score of -151), while Health Minister Budi Gunadi Sadikin and Education Minister Abdul Mu’ti received the highest marks.
While reshuffles may temporarily address inefficiencies, they also signal instability and a lack of coherent long-term planning. A bloated cabinet, combined with frequent personnel changes, risks bureaucratic fragmentation and policy inconsistency.
The MBG Program: From Noble Vision to National Scandal
No policy better encapsulates the contradictions of the Prabowo–Gibran administration than the Free Nutritious Meals (MBG) program. Launched with fanfare in January 2025, MBG aimed to combat malnutrition among Indonesia’s most vulnerable populations through a nationwide network of 30,000 centralized kitchens.
But the program quickly unraveled. Reports of mass food poisoning emerged from regions like Baubau, Banggai, Garut, and Cipongkor (West Bandung). Investigations revealed systemic failures: kitchens operating without food safety certifications, using expired ingredients, lacking refrigeration, and staffed by untrained personnel. In Cipongkor alone, 85 MBG kitchens were found to be non-compliant with basic health standards.
Critics argue the program was rushed and politicized. Contracts were allegedly awarded to foundations linked to retired military officers and political allies, bypassing transparent procurement processes. Worse, there were reports of Rp70 trillion in MBG funds being diverted to unrelated agricultural revitalization projects—funds originally earmarked for education.
Public trust eroded rapidly. A Celios survey found that 64% of respondents believed MBG was “not well-targeted,” and 71% criticized its nutritional standards and monitoring. The Indostrategi Institute gave MBG the lowest score (2.68/5) among all flagship programs. Experts from Monash University Indonesia have called for a temporary suspension of the program until rigorous safety protocols, centralized monitoring, and inter-ministerial oversight (involving Health Ministry and BPOM) are implemented.
What began as a humanitarian mission has become a symbol of governance failure—where good intentions are undone by poor execution, lack of accountability, and potential corruption.
Democracy Under Pressure: Repression, Militarization, and the Silenced Opposition
Perhaps the most alarming trend of the past year has been the systematic erosion of democratic space. Backed by a supermajority in parliament, the administration has shown little tolerance for dissent. Peaceful protests—such as the “Indonesia Is Anxious” rally by student alliances on October 20, 2025—have been met with excessive force.
According to Amnesty International Indonesia, between March and August 2025, state forces committed 5,538 human rights violations during public demonstrations, including 4,453 arrests, 744 cases of physical violence, and the detention of 12 activists on dubious charges of “incitement.” President Prabowo himself has labeled protesters as “subversives” or “terrorists,” rhetoric that legitimizes repression.
New regulations, such as Police Regulation No. 4/2025, expand the use of firearms by law enforcement, raising fears of lethal escalation. Meanwhile, freedom of expression has declined: 35% of citizens report no improvement in civil liberties, and 28% say their rights are “severely unprotected” compared to the previous administration.
The military’s role in civilian affairs has also expanded. A revised Military Law increases the number of active-duty officers in civilian institutions from 10 to 16. Plans to establish 37 new military districts (Kodam), 100 battalions, and 20 territorial development brigades by 2029 signal a return to the dwifungsi (dual function) doctrine of the Suharto era. Proposals to grant the military criminal investigation powers under the draft Cybersecurity Bill further blur the line between defense and domestic control.
With the opposition fragmented and PDIP—despite its 110 parliamentary seats—choosing a passive “balancing” role rather than active resistance, checks and balances have weakened. The result is a de facto one-party dominance, where criticism is criminalized, and democratic institutions serve the ruling coalition rather than the public.
Public Trust and Approval Ratings: A Widening Credibility Gap
The administration’s self-assessment stands in stark contrast to public perception. Government statements highlight achievements like lower food prices, infrastructure acceleration, and fiscal discipline. Officials claim all campaign promises are on track, with economic growth “stable at 5%.”
But independent surveys tell a different story. A Celios survey (September–October 2025) gave President Prabowo a dismal 3/10 and Vice President Gibran a mere 2/10. Over 70% of respondents rated government performance as “poor” or “very poor,” and 80% said policies do not reflect public needs. Alarmingly, 90% criticized the government’s communication as ineffective or opaque.
Moreover, 56% of citizens believe only a few campaign promises have been fulfilled, while 43% say none have been kept. If an election were held today, 36% would not re-elect the Prabowo–Gibran ticket.
These figures reveal a deep credibility gap. While the government projects confidence, the public sees unmet promises, bureaucratic chaos, and a leadership disconnected from everyday struggles.
Conclusion: Stability at What Cost?
The first year of the Prabowo–Gibran administration has been defined by a central paradox: the pursuit of stability through centralized control, often at the expense of democratic resilience and economic dynamism.
On one hand, the government has maintained social peace through generous welfare programs and co-opted potential rivals through political inclusion. On the other, it has weakened oversight institutions, suppressed dissent, and implemented policies with little regard for technical rigor or public consultation.
The MBG scandal, the militarization of governance, the erosion of civil liberties, and the collapse in public trust are not isolated incidents—they are symptoms of a broader governing philosophy that values order over openness, loyalty over competence, and short-term legitimacy over sustainable development.
As Indonesia enters the second year of this administration, the critical question is whether course correction is possible. Will reshuffles lead to better governance? Will digitalization empower citizens or enhance surveillance? And will the silent opposition—particularly PDIP—finally find its voice?
For now, the legacy of Year One is clear: a government that commands power, but not yet the people’s trust.
